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The need for land-related investment to ensure 
sustainable land management and increase productivity 
of land use is widely recognized. However, there is little 
rigorous evidence on the effects of property rights for 
increasing agricultural productivity and contributing 
toward poverty reduction in Africa. Whether and by how 
much overlapping property rights reduce investment 
incentives, and the scope for policies to counter such 
disincentives, are thus important policy issues. Using 
This paper—a product of the Sustainable Rural and Urban Development Team, Development Research Group—is part 
of a larger effort in the group to assess the impact of land policies. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the 
Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at kdeininger@worldbank.org. 
information on parcels under ownership and usufruct 
by the same household from a nationally representative 
survey in Uganda, the authors find significant 
disincentives associated with overlapping property rights 
on short and long-term investments. The paper combines 
this result with information on crop productivity to 
obtain a rough estimate of the magnitudes involved. 
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 1. Introduction 
Investment, much of it attached to land, will be critical to ensure economic growth, poverty reduction, and 
sustainable natural resource management in the world’s least developed countries, especially in Africa. 
Access to improved agricultural technology, infrastructure, and output as well as factor markets will 
increase the returns and therefore encourage such investment. Assuring investors that they will be able to 
reap the returns from investing through secure property rights will be fundamental to increase land-related 
investment. Yet, while a growing literature explores the impact of titling on investment and productivity 
of land use in Africa, the link between such programs and tenure security has often been tenuous. As a 
result, no clear consensus has yet emerged on whether insecure tenure is something one should be worried 
about and, if yes, what measures will be most effective in confronting it. 
To address this issue, this paper quantifies the investment impact of property rights insecurity 
arising from overlapping land rights rather than comparing titled and untitled land. We do so for the case 
of Uganda, a country where overlapping property rights, many of them established a long time ago, are 
very common. This, together with the ability to rely on a large nationally representative household survey, 
allows us to go beyond the existing literature in three respects. First, while the historical genesis of 
overlapping rights makes it unlikely that such arrangements were chosen based on comparing the cost and 
benefits of different contractual forms, our ability to apply household level fixed effect estimation 
techniques to a large sample of (owner-cum-occupant) households who simultaneously operate own and 
usufruct parcels allows us to avoid many of the biases that have characterized cross sectional estimates in 
the past. Second, the existence of laws aiming to eliminate investment disincentives arising from 
overlapping property rights enables us to assess whether, and if yes to what extent, such laws have 
achieved their objective. This provides lessons on the scope to reduce underinvestment associated with 
insecure tenure through (legislative) means that stop short of changing the land ownership structure. 
Finally, information on tenants’ willingness to purchase residual rights to land they currently occupy 
provides not only an independent indicator of the perceived efficiency losses associated with overlapping 
and insecure property rights, but can also help highlight options for possible decentralized mechanisms to 
change the land ownership structure and thus bring about efficiency gains associated with higher levels of 
investment in a way that may be more effective than what is proposed currently.  
Our analysis contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we find that overlapping rights 
significantly reduce tenants’ incentives to invest in trees, soil conservation structures and manure 
application, and that the effects are large by any measure. A conservative estimate suggests that 
investment disincentives from overlapping property rights alone can reduce productivity by up to 25% 
depending on the type of crop planted on the parcel. Second, we find that legal provisions aiming to give 
  1de facto ownership rights to tenants on lands held only under usufruct helped to attenuate insecurity of 
property rights and brought investment incentives closer to that on own land but failed to fully eliminate 
underinvestment. This can partly be ascribed to limited knowledge of these provisions and fear about 
possible policy reversal even by those who know the policy. Third, the fact that a surprisingly large share 
of tenants is willing to pay for residual property rights and that the amounts offered vastly exceed the 
capitalized value of landlords’ residual claims provides independent support to our results, suggesting that 
in situations where public sector efforts to enhance security of property rights are either infeasible or not 
credible, decentralized approaches to deal with these may merit greater attention.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section two describes the evolution of Uganda’s land tenure 
system, illustrating how overlapping land rights came into being and how the 1998 Land Act addresses 
them. It links land-related investment to poverty and equity by highlighting how low growth of 
agricultural productivity and declining soil fertility are at the root of a recent widening of rural-urban 
income gaps and introduces the conceptual framework and estimation strategy. Section three describes the 
data used and provides descriptive statistics on income sources, land rights, productivity, and land-
attached investment for the overall sample and for the sub-sample of owner-cum-occupants used in the 
econometric analysis. Section four discusses results from the empirical analysis to make inferences on 
investment disincentives due to overlapping land rights, possible productivity implications, and the scope 
for solutions that may be satisfactory to both parties. Section five summarizes findings and policy 
implications. 
2. Background and empirical approach  
To motivate our analysis, this section highlights key historical events that have reduced tenure security for 
a large number of occupants and measures taken by the recently passed Land Act to restore such security, 
based on recognition of the importance of land-related investment and higher agricultural productivity for 
pro-poor growth that will help narrow the gaps between rural and urban well-being in Uganda. We use 
this to outline the estimation strategy to be utilized and discuss some of the associated econometric issues.  
2.1 Origins and incidence of overlapping tenure in Uganda  
The main reason for the prevalence of overlapping property in Uganda’s land tenure system dates back to 
colonial occupation. Under the 1900 Buganda agreement,
1 the British awarded large tracts of “mailo” 
land, together with any smallholders occupying them, to the Buganda king and his notables (Brett 1973). 
Lands not covered under this agreement were declared Crown Land, allowing the government to alienate 
                                                 
1 In this agreement, the total area of Uganda, estimated at 19,600 square miles, was divided into three broad classes. The first class, comprising 
958 square miles, was given to the Buganda king (kabaka), the second one, amounting to a total of 8,000 square miles, was distributed equally 
among 1,000 chiefs and private land owners. The remainder was declared Crown Land and vested in the colonial Government (West 1972). 
  2such land (including their occupants) under freehold or leasehold grants. This implied that peasants on 
customary lands had no ownership rights of their own but were instead declared tenants often with little 
security against eviction. In 1928, residual rights of original occupants recognized and strengthened 
through laws which put a limit on the rent to be paid and provided protection against eviction without 
compensation for improvements.
2 Still, the overlap and implied insecurity of rights is likely to have 
undermined incentives for land-related investment and provided a fertile ground for conflict.  
Nationalization of land under Idi Amin’s 1975 land reform decree added to this complexity. The 
decree abolished freehold and mailo ownership and converted all land held under these categories into 
leasehold but made no attempt to resolve the problem of overlapping land rights (Baland et al. 2007). In 
fact, overlapping rights (kibanjas) have become common outside of traditional mailo areas as well. The 
1998 Land Act includes far-reaching steps to increase tenure security for occupants who had only use 
rights, customary land users, and women. Regarding the latter, the Land Act provides for formal 
recognition of customary land ownership and establishes procedures for customary owners to obtain a 
“certificate of customary ownership” that can be transferred through sale, rent, gift, or mortgage, and 
converted into freehold titles in an administrative process. It also aims to significantly strengthen 
women’s land rights. However, effectiveness of these progressive features, many of which are effective 
without any formal process or survey, is hampered by flaws in the institutional designs for 
implementation (Hunt 2004). As a consequence, almost a decade after the Act’s passage, hardly any 
implementation has happened, despite considerable grassroots demand (Rugadya et al. 2004).  
Inability to resist political demands for reinstating mailo as a separate land ownership category or 
to abandoni kibanjas outside of mailo areas precluded award of full ownership to tenants, thus leaving 
overlapping land ownership structures intact. At the same time, attempts were made to attenuate 
disincentive effects from overlapping rights by granting far-reaching protection to tenants. Bona fide 
occupants, defined as those who had peacefully occupied a piece of land for 12 years before passage of 
the Act, were provided with permanent and inheritable usufruct rights in return for annual payment of a 
nominal ground rent.
3 Recognizing that the overlap of rights thus enshrined in law could undermine 
investment incentives and lead to inefficient land use, provisions were also made for a land fund, with 
applicability initially limited to Kibaale district, to provide resources to buy out landlords’ residual claims 
(Hunt 2004). Although neither guidelines nor funds for its operation have been made available, 
expectation of government intervention in the land market has already led to significant rises in self-
assessed land prices (Deininger et al. 2006). These in turn make it more difficult to economically justify 
                                                 
2 The legal provisions are contained in the busuulu (ground rent) and envujju (tribute) laws.  
3 The ground rent amounts to USh 1,000 (US$ 0.6) per tenant, irrespectively of the area occupied. Mailo tenants were also given the option of 
applying for a certificate of occupancy that would provide rights to give, sublet, mortgage, and inherit land, and that could be converted into 
freehold title with consent of the registered owner although no such certificates have yet been issued. 
  3such an intervention at a scale commensurate with the dimensions of the problem, implying that 
overlapping rights will continue to be an important issue in Uganda for some time. 
While the literature on this topic has focused on the difficulty to contract for longer-term inputs, 
there are two additional reasons that lead us to expect negative impacts on investment and efficiency of 
overlapping property rights in the Ugandan context. On the one hand, knowledge of the favorable 
provisions of the Land Act, most importantly the fact that landlords can not impose limits on bona fide 
tenants’ ability to make investments, remains limited (Deininger et al. 2006). On the other hand, even 
tenants who are aware of the provisions of the Land Act are concerned that the current favorable policy 
stance may be reversed at some point in the future. Both are likely to reduce incentives for investment, 
thereby reducing the efficiency of land use and leaving landlords as well as occupants worse off.  
The continued importance of agriculture for economic development and poverty reduction in 
Uganda implies that, in addition to exploring the magnitude of possible underinvestment on lands without 
clear property rights, finding ways to increase investment could have high social benefits. With more than 
85% of the population still living in rural areas and agriculture accounting for 77% of employment and 
50% of total output (Belshaw et al. 1999), land-related investment will be critical for growth and poverty 
reduction. Household survey data point towards a large and possibly widening gap between rural and 
urban levels of consumption and recent increases in poverty. After decreasing from 59.7% in 1992 to 
37.4% in 1999/2000, rural poverty increased to 41.1% in 2002/2003. The fact that poverty among crop 
farmers is much above the rural average (Kappel et al. 2005), something that is often attributed to limited 
agricultural productivity growth (Republic of Uganda 2005), implies that ways to increase agricultural 
productivity will be critical to prevent widening of rural-urban income gaps.  
Land-related investments will be critical in this respect because the scope for expansion of 
cultivated area which, together with elimination of implicit and explicit taxation of the agricultural sector, 
provided the basis for increased levels of agricultural productivity in Uganda during the 1990s (Blake et 
al. 2002), is diminishing rapidly. Studies highlight that, despite a favorable environment in the 1990s, 
land-related investment and diversification of the productive sector remained limited (Belshaw et al. 
1999) and that the area expansion at the expense of woodlots, wetlands and natural grazing lands on 
which it was based was unsustainable to begin with (Place and Otsuka 2000, Pender 2004). Rates of 
manure and fertilizer application remain extremely low even by African standards, implying that Uganda 
is drawing down natural capital at an alarmingly rapid rate (Pender 2004). While overlapping property 
rights could possibly explain part of this phenomenon, no studies have thus far explored this issue. Below, 
we first discuss empirical literature on the link between property rights and investment and use this to 
present our empirical strategy.  
  42.2 Conceptual framework  
The conceptual link between tenure security and transferability of land and incentives for investment and 
efficiency of resource use rests on arguments emphasizing three aspects of property rights, namely: (i) 
security against eviction; (ii) transferability; and (iii) access to formal documentation, normally in the 
form of public registries that allows use of land as a low-cost collateral for credit. These three aspects 
build on each other, i.e. lack of tenure security in the form of a pending threat of eviction will make it 
harder to transfer land or result in a much discounted price for doing so. More relevant for the Ugandan 
case, land that is “encumbered” by either the presence of a tenant who can not be evicted or a landlord 
who holds residual rights to it will be virtually worthless as collateral even in cases where it is registered.
4  
Secure rights protecting them against eviction or other ways of land loss will provide land users 
with assurance that they will be able to enjoy the fruits of their labor, thereby encouraging them to make 
long-term investments and manage land in a sustainable fashion (Besley 1995). Adding the right to 
transfer land to others, either through rental or sale, has two effects. First, it will encourage investment as 
it makes it easier to liquidate such investment in case of an exogenous shock (Ayalew et al. 2005, 
Deininger and Jin 2006). Second, transferability is also a precondition for bringing land to more efficient 
uses, thus maximizing output and allocative efficiency and having labor move from agriculture to non-
agricultural pursuits in the broader context of economic development (Kung 2002).
5 Finally, having a 
formal and low-cost way to unambiguously identify land ownership without a need of physical 
inspection, enquiry with neighbors, or interaction with an extensive bureaucracy will allow the use of land 
as collateral, thereby reducing the transaction cost of credit access. In the absence of other obstacles to the 
operation of financial markets, formalizing land tenure and establishment of registries can thus encourage 
development of financial markets and of more sophisticated financial instruments that draw on the 
abstract representation of property rights provided by formal titles (de Soto 2000).  
Empirical quantification of the investment-disincentive effects of insecure tenure raises problems 
of measurement as well as attribution. The first set of issues arises as tenure insecurity is 
multidimensional and subjective and many of the relevant elements are easily observed or measured by 
                                                 
4 Although our emphasis is not on credit effects, we note that as a title registration system was introduced and maintained for the about 15% of 
the area which was given out by the British as mailo lands, Uganda is one of few African countries where a functioning system of title 
registration covers a non-negligible share of land. However, failure to include encumbrances, in particular the presence of tenants, on the titles 
severely undermines the usefulness of these documents. Banks who lent against such titles discovered that, due to the presence of tenants with 
far-reaching rights on the land which they had accepted as collateral, the land was virtually worthless and the loans had to be written off. The 
widespread incidence of such encumbrances, together with the failure to disclose them on the title implies that it is near-impossible to use land 
title to gain access credit even for those who own unencumbered mailo land and, as a consequence, very few owners bother to update their titles. 
Unless it is accompanied by far-reaching changes in the type of information registered, modernization of the mailo registry is thus unlikely to 
improve impact on credit access. 
5 In fact, with rapid economic transition (e.g. at the urban fringe or in areas of rapid commercial expansion) and the associated increase in the 
number of transactions, ways of ensuring the legitimacy of land transfers and eliminate incentives for opportunistic behavior by one of the 
contracting parties have acquired great importance in many African land tenure systems (Lavigne-Delville 2006). 
  5outsiders. While some studies investigated the impact of title or other forms of formal documentation 
(Pinckney and Kimuyu 1994, Migot-Adholla et al. 1994, Roth et al. 1994), possession of a formal 
document is not necessarily equivalent to higher levels of tenure security (Atwood 1990). Other studies 
have therefore used subjective measures of the threat of expropriation (Jacoby et al. 2002), composite 
measures of self-assessed transfer rights (Blarel 1994, Matlon 1994, Besley 1995, Place and Migot-
Adholla 1998, Place and Otsuka 2001), or a combination of the two (Ayalew et al. 2005, Deininger and 
Jin 2006, Deininger et al. 2006). The results of any empirical study will have to be interpreted 
accordingly, bearing in mind that measures of transfer rights already incorporate tenure security aspects, 
thus making it difficult to separate the two.  
A second empirical challenge is that tenure security will often not be exogenous. In our case, this 
concern is attenuated by the fact that many of the parcels
6 held under usufruct had been assigned long 
time ago rather than having been selected by the households cultivating them. In fact, the exogenous 
historical assignment of land, together with the lack of market transactions for encumbered land and the 
absence of readily available opportunities to change the tenure status of occupied land to full ownership 
provides us with a situation that is akin to a natural experiment.
7 It implies that, as long as we will be able 
to control for systematic differences across households, it will be possible to obtain an estimate of the 
impact of tenure status on investment. While some of the relevant household characteristics, e.g. access to 
capital and education, can be controlled for in a regression framework, others such as managerial skills 
and entrepreneurial drive are not easily observed. If, as one would expect, such unobservable attributes 
are positively correlated with a household’s propensity to have title or other measures of tenure security 
and transferability of land failure to correct for this would result in upward bias on estimates of the impact 
of title even if one were to control for differences in title-holders’ observed characteristics.  
A standard way of correcting for the impact of unobserved characteristics in situations where 
multiple observations that differ in the characteristic of interest e.g. plots with different tenure status are 
available for the same unit of observation, normally a household, is to use within-household fixed effects 
estimates. Although this technique has been applied to test for differences in input intensity and outputs 
between sharecropped and owner-cultivated plots (Shaban 1987), its use for land-related investment has 
been limited. The fact that our sample includes a much larger number of households who simultaneously 
cultivate land held under usufruct and full ownership than has been available in similar studies allows us 
                                                 
6 Throughout this paper, parcels are defined as contiguous pieces of land with no variation in tenure status whereas plots are contiguous pieces of 
land of given tenure that are cultivated with a specific crop or mixture of crops. The number of plots is thus always equal to or larger than the 
number of parcels.  
7 The combination of a very active market for unencumbered together with virtual non-existence of market transactions for encumbered land is 
visible from descriptive statistics which indicated that more than 40% of owned parcels but less than 4% of occupied ones had been acquired 
through purchase. 
  6to use this method to empirically identify tenure security effects.
8 Moreover, as legal provisions imply 
recognition of the occupancy rights of tenants who have occupied their land for 12 years, we can assess 
whether, and if yes to what extent, such legal action to make usufruct rights permanent and heritable has 
been effective in bringing investment incentives closer to the social optimum by testing for differences in 
the level of investment between those tenants who are recognized and those who are not.  
2.3 Estimation strategy 
The types of land-related investment considered in our empirical estimation are establishment of fruit and 
coffee trees in the last 5 years; and short-term measures such as terracing and bunding, and manure 
application during the last year.
9 In each case, dummy variables are used to indicate whether or not this 
type of investment had been undertaken using a linear probability model which, according to the literature 
will yield consistent estimates of the parameters in question (Heckman and MaCurdy 1985, Angrist 1991, 
Hoxby 1996).
10 Letting i denote parcels and h households, the equation to be estimated is:  
, * * hi h hi hi L hi hi D hi M hi h W hi T hi
Q D M M D W D I ε α γ γ γ γ + + ′ + + + + + = X β L ' γ    (1) 
where I
Q
hi is a dummy that equals one if household h invested in land improvements of type Q on parcel 
i;
11 Dih is a dummny equaling one if parcel i is owned by the household and zero if it is operated under 
usufruct; Mhi is a dummy indicating mailo or freehold tenure, Lih is a vector of two dummies indicting 
whether a parcel held under usufruct enjoys legal protection; Wh denotes household wealth; Xih is a vector 
of parcel-specific characteristics; αh is the household-specific fixed effect; εih is an unobserved parcel 
level error term with mean zero and constant variance; and β and γ are the parameter vectors to be 
estimated. As noted earlier, the fixed effect αh controls for unobserved household-specific factors, e.g. 
farming ability and motivation that affect the propensity to invest on owned and occupied parcels equally 
but which, unless controlled for, would bias any empirical estimates.  
In this context,  γT will provide a measure of the ownership effect, i.e. the increment in the 
probability of a specific type of investment having been undertaken on owned as compared to usufruct 
land by the same household. A key difference between customary and mailo or freehold land is that the 
latter is normally registered so that the coefficients γM and γD would indicate an impact of formal tenure 
                                                 
8 With more than 1,700 households who simultaneously operate at least one parcel under ownership and one parcel under tenancy, our sample is 
an order of magnitude larger than that of other studies, e.g. a recent study on Nicaragua that relies on less than 100 households  (Bandiera 2007).  
9 As neither of these requires large capital outlays, any impacts we may find would be attributable to tenure security- and transferability- than to 
credit market-effects associated with better definition of land rights. 
10 To deal with concerns about possible hetroskedasticity, we use robust standard errors and t-statistics throughout. For trees, the dummy variable 
is complemented with the number of trees planted during the last 5 years in a random effect tobit model. Results, which are very similar to those 
for the linear probability model, are available upon request. No ordinal measures of the intensity of investment (e.g. the length and height of 
terraces or bunds) were available that would have allowed us to do the same for our other measures of investment.  
11 Although it is not a measure of investment, we also include a measure indicating whether or not any trees existed on a given parcel. Among 
others, this allows to compare our results to those obtained in other studies.  
  7status on investment, either independently or only for parcels that have ownership rights. To test whether 
possible investment-effects of ownership vary with household wealth, something that could point to either 
credit constraints or risk aversion affecting investment behavior, we include an interaction term with this 
variable. As the 1998 Land Act provides legal protection for usufruct parcels that had been occupied for 
12 years or more, one of the elements of Lih is a dummy for a parcel having been occupied for longer than 
this period. To be able to distinguish the impact of explicit legal protection from that brought about by the 
mere passage of time, we also include a dummy equaling one if the parcel had been occupied for longer 




L be the coefficients corresponding to the former and the 
latter, respectively, we can test whether providing legal protection attenuates (γ
1
L>0) or completely 
eliminates (γ
1
L=  γT) investment disincentives associated with usufruct and whether such an effect is 




L) or the mere passage of time. This effect may vary 
between mailo and non-mailo land. Finally, the vector of control variables includes parcel level measures 
of soil fertility, topography, length of possession, distance to homestead, and access to water sources.  
With Yhi denoting the monetary value of output or the amount of total or family labor days per 
acre in an output or input regressions, we can estimate an equation to compare outputs and key inputs 
between owned and occupied parcels cultivated by the same household as  
, * hi h hi hi hi D hi M hi hi T hi D M M D Y ε α ϕ γ γ γ + + ′ + + + ′ + = K X β    (2) 
where Kht is a vector of crop dummies and the remaining variables are as defined above. The purpose of 
doing so is twofold. First, it allows us to test whether, once the fixed investment associated with the 
cultivation of permanent crops and other observable characteristics are accounted for, land tenure will still 
have a systematic effect on the level of output obtained or input use. As there is no justification in theory 
for such an effect, failure to reject the hypothesis that γT=0 in either regression would imply presence of 
systematic but unobserved differences between owned and occupied parcels and can thus serve as a test of 
the quality of our empirical framework. Second, as the element of φ corresponding to a particular crop in 
the yield regression is nothing but the percentage increase of output associated with planting a tree crop, it 
can, together with the coefficient for tree investment from (1), be used to approximate the potential 
productivity impacts of more secure land rights.  
One of the difficulties of implementing (2) empirically is that, because of the prevalence of mixed 
and intercropping in Uganda, data on output, unlike information on inputs and crops grown which is 
available at the plot or parcel level, respectively, was collected only by crop. Thus, while we are able to 
estimate an equation for labor input at the parcel level, the output equation can only be estimated at the 
household level. To eliminate errors that would have been introduced by apportioning outputs to parcels 
  8of different tenure in cases where the same crop was grown on owned and occupied ones, we drop parcels 
if, in the same household, there is another parcel of different tenure devoted to the same crop, either as a 
pure or mixed stand. This implies that, for the case of output, our sample contains owner-cum-occupants 
who cultivated different types of crops on at least one of their owned and their occupied parcels.
12  
3. Data and descriptive evidence  
Descriptive evidence from a large and nationally representative household survey at household and parcel 
levels illustrates the large number of owner-cum-occupants who differ from pure owners and, to a lesser 
degree, occupants, in few of the variables of interest. At the same time, it points towards presence of 
systematic differences in investment between owned and occupied parcels which provide the motivation 
for more detailed econometric analysis.  
3.1 Data sources and household characteristics  
The data for our study come from the 2005/2006 Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS), fieldwork 
for which was conducted by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics from May 2005 to April 2006. The survey 
collected information at the community, household, and parcel level for about 7,500 households in 753 
EAs including 30 IDP camps. Household level data cover demographics, main economic activities, 
education, health, assets, income levels and sources, as well as consumption and welfare indicators. The 
agricultural module provides information on ownership status, crop production, input use and land-related 
investment at the parcel level, complemented by other forms agricultural income.
13 The 2002 population 
census was used as a sample frame. Following stratification into urban (30%) and rural (70%) sub-
samples, enumeration areas (EAs) were chosen with the probability of selection being proportional to 
size. Based on a listing of households in each of the selected EAs, 10 households per EA were randomly 
sampled. As table 1 illustrates, 5,530 of the sample households were involved in agricultural activities. Of 
these, about 31%, or 1,728 with 5,448 parcels, are mixed owner/occupants who operated at least one 
parcel under full ownership and one under usufruct. This sub-sample forms the basis for our analysis.  
Descriptive statistics point towards a number of interesting features. First, cultivation of land that 
is only occupied rather than owned is widespread; only some 49% of cultivators are pure owners, 20% 
cultivate only occupied land, and about 31% are owner-cum-occupants who cultivate owned and occupied 
land simultaneously. Second, although per capita expenditure by those in agriculture is, with about 19 
                                                 
12 To check whether this introduces any non-randomness, we compare total asset endowments and their composition, monthly consumption 
expenditure, and basic demographic characteristics between households who are included and those who have at least some parcels dropped. And 
find no significant differences in either of them.  
13 Information on crop output was collected at the crop level, separately for the two main agricultural seasons (July - December 2004 and January 
- June 2005). A diary was used for continuously harvested crops and prices, in addition to standard socio-economic information, were collected at 
the community level.  
  9US$ per month,
14 significantly below that by non-agriculturalists (45 US$ per month), pure owners are 
better off than the rest in terms of total land owned (9.5 vs. 3.2 acres for owner-cum-occupants), the value 
of own land, livestock, and non-land assets (US$ 4,011, 968 and 1733 vs. 1651, 227, and 1252, 
respectively), and overall welfare as measured by per capita income (US$ 226 vs. 193). Third, while crop 
productivity
15 for pure occupants is not significantly different from that for pure owners (US$ 95.3 vs. 
US$ 96.7 per acre) it is below that achieved by owner-cum-occupants (US$ 110.8/ac.). While pure 
owners have access to more land than owner-cum-occupants, there is no significant difference in the 
amount of land cultivated by the two groups during the 2004/5 agricultural season. Pure occupants 
cultivated significantly less land than any of the two other groups and, as a result, derived a much larger 
share of their income (42%) from wage employment, as compared to mixed farmers (24%) and pure 
owners (30%). Finally, with only 16.5% of households and 9.5% of women knowing about the 1998 Land 
Act, legal awareness remains low.  
3.2 Parcel level characteristics  
Tables 2 and 3 provide evidence on physical characteristics, perceived property and transfer rights and the 
incidence of land-related investments, and on cropping patterns and intensity of input use, respectively, at 
the parcel level.
16 In all cases, information is provided for the full sample (cols. 1-3) and owner-cum-
occupants (cols. 4-6), further distinguishing parcels under full ownership and under usufruct for each of 
them. There is little appreciable difference in physical parcel attributes such as land area, land quality, 
topography, or distance to the owner’s homestead, between owned and usufruct land for any of the 
samples. Second, despite the lack of differences in physical characteristics, the perceived likelihood of 
conflict on parcels held under usufruct is, with about 20% as compared to 11% significantly higher than 
on own parcels, even within the same household and despite the fact that usufruct parcels are more likely 
to be held under mailo, freehold, or leasehold and thus can be formally registered. This provides a first 
indication that incentives to invest may be systematically lower on usufruct than on own parcels. Third, 
the fact that perceived rights to transfer and mortgage parcels held under usufruct are much more 
restricted suggests that, in addition to possible investment disincentives, limits on the ability to lease or 
otherwise transfer such parcels to others for (temporary) cultivation could further impair the efficiency 
with which they are used.
17 Despite the fact that there are no legal provisions constraining investment on 
                                                 
14 To improve readability, we report values in US $ terms throughout, using an exchange rate of 1860 Uganda Shilling to the dollar.  
15 Crop productivity is defined here as plot area weighted average of the value of crop output per acre of the two agricultural seasons.  
16 As in the regression analysis of input intensities (table 3), the unit of analysis is a parcel in a given season, parcels cultivated in both of 
Uganda’s two agricultural seasons will contribute two observations to this analysis.  
17 Of course, within-household analysis as conducted here will not be able to uncover allocative efficiency effects of this nature. A similar 
argument applies to the ability to use land as collateral, which will be available at the household level. For example, if inability to use land as 
collateral would reduce input intensity, this would be a constraint only to pure occupants whereas owner-cum-occupants would be able to avail of 
credit (which would then be likely to affect input intensity on all parcels cultivated, irrespectively of their tenure status) as long as one of the 
parcels—most likely the one under full ownership—will be suitable as collateral.  
  10land held under usufruct, even owner-cum-occupants perceive not to have the right to plant trees on more 
than 90% of the parcels they occupy, compared to only about 5% on the parcels they own.  
In view of this, it should not be too surprising to find differences in the stock of investment 
between owned and occupied parcels, overall and for owner-cum-occupants only. Panel 2 of table 2 
demonstrates that the magnitudes involved are non-trivial. The share of occupied parcels with trees is less 
than half that for owned ones. With 138 trees per acre on owned as compared to 13 on occupied ones, 
variation in tree-density on parcels where some investment occurred are even more pronounced. 
Differences between owned and occupied parcels are equally marked if new tree investment in the last 5 
years is considered. The incidence of such investment on occupied parcels is less than one-fifth of that 
encountered on owned ones throughout. For example, for owner-cum-occupants, trees were established 
on 25% of owned as compared to 3% of occupied parcels and even where tree investment was 
undertaken, the numbers differ markedly; with 28 trees on average on owned as compared to 6 on 
occupied parcels. While slightly higher, soil conservation measures such as bunding, terracing, and 
mulching, were applied on 11% of occupied as compared to 28% of owned parcels. While application of 
manure is low in general, the incidence of manure use is over three times higher on owned as compared to 
occupied parcels.  
Table 3 highlights the impact on cropping patterns at the parcel level. We note that perennials, 
e.g. banana and coffee are grown disproportionately on owned parcels whereas occupied parcels are 
mostly planted with annuals i.e. cereals, pulses and oilseeds. While application of purchased inputs is low 
irrespectively of tenure status, manure is more often and more intensively applied on owned parcels. The 
same is true for intensity of labor use which is markedly higher on occupied as compared to owned 
parcels. All of this calls for more detailed multivariate analysis.  
4. Econometric evidence  
Household-level fixed effect for investment and productivity of land use on owned compared to occupied 
parcels point towards significantly reduced investment incentives on the latter. While tenure no longer 
affects productivity if crop choice is controlled for, much higher levels of productivity under perennials 
suggest a significant productivity impact of tenure. Legal provisions reduce, but can not eliminate tenure 
security and the associated under-investment.  
4.1 Investment impact of overlapping land rights  
Results from linear probability household fixed effect estimates for land-related investments at the parcel 
level are presented in tables 4 and 5, separately for whether a parcel had any tree crops (col. 1), whether 
trees had been planted during the last 5 years (col. 2), and whether soil conservation or manure had been 
  11applied over the last year (col. 3 and col. 4). Tenure security effects are identified based on comparing 
owned and occupied parcels by the same household. Regressions provide strong evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that ownership has a significant and large effect on increasing investment incentives.  
A first result of interest relates to the high significance and large magnitude of the estimated 
coefficients. Compared to the ones under usufruct, owned parcels are 31 percentage points more likely to 
have trees and the probability of past tree and soil conservation investments on them in the applicable 
reference periods is higher by 17 and 13 percentage points.
18 A highly significant effect, albeit of rather 
small magnitude, emerges for application of manure. Mailo or freehold tenure, which is often 
synonymous with registration, is estimated to have no direct effect on investment levels. At the same 
time, the ownership-induced increase in investment incentives for trees, but not soil conservation and 
manure application, is much larger on freehold or mailo where full ownership is estimated to lead to an 
increase of 38 and 31 points in the probability of tree presence and of tree investment having been 
undertaken during the last 5 years, respectively. Estimated increases in the share of plots with a particular 
type of investment due to a simulated change of tenure status to full ownership on all occupied parcels are 
summarized in the bottom of table 4 for all and only occupied parcels, respectively. On occupied parcels, 
giving full ownership will increase tree-investment more than five-fold, manure application more than 
two-fold and will more than double the incidence of soil conservation. This suggests that current 
institutional arrangements are indeed associated with considerable underinvestment and that finding ways 
to eliminate them is a policy priority.  
While the potentially large productivity effects are of great relevance for policy makers in 
Uganda, it is of interest to note that, to the extent that it is possible to compare, these effects are not only 
much larger but also significantly more robust and based on a more elaborate sample than what has been 
found in the literature. Although tree presence is an imperfect proxy for actual investment, the magnitude 
of the ownership effect obtained here is significantly larger (3 times for freehold and mailo) than the 13% 
obtained for Nicaragua although high levels of tenure insecurity in this country (World Bank 2003, 
Bandiera 2007) would lead one to expect a larger impact of clarifying land rights. The point estimate for 
the effect of ownership on manure application is above the one obtained in Pakistan using a comparable 
methodology (Jacoby and Mansuri 2006).  
Second, and in line with the notion that none of the investments considered here require any 
significant cash outlay, the presence of a wealth effect, which could have been interpreted as an indication 
of risk aversion or credit constraints is rejected in all equations. This implies that providing more secure 
                                                 
18 Separate regressions, as reported in appendix table 1, suggest that owned parcels are 14% more likely to have been planted with fruit and 7% 
more likely to have been planted with coffee trees. 
  12tenure will benefit rich and poor equally. It also supports the hypothesis that, in the Ugandan context, 
realizing potential credit effects from land titles will require a more comprehensive restructuring of the 
registry. Although their magnitude remains modest compared to that of the ownership dummy, other 
parcel characteristics have the expected signs. Length of possession is estimated to increase the 
propensity to undertake tree, soil conservation investment and manuring by 0.2 points per additional year. 
The distance to the owner’s homestead will reduce the likely to make both short- and long-term 
investments. Soil conservation measures but not tree investments are more likely on good quality land 
and swamps and wetlands where the returns from doing so are likely to be higher. Trees are more likely to 
be planted on larger parcels although parcel size does not matter for soil conservation.  
Finally, we aim to infer the effectiveness of legal protection from coefficients on dummies for 
longer-term possession (5-12 and > 12 years, respectively) as discussed earlier. Relevant regression 
results and tests for relationships between coefficients, presented in table 5, lead us to conclude that 
granting legal protection to bona fide occupants attenuates investment disincentives in a way that goes 





L significant, suggesting that what we find is a legal rather than just a time-effect. Still, 
while it is not surprising to find that tests consistently reject the hypothesis of γ
2
L = γT  at the 1% level, 
pointing towards significant under-investment on parcels that were occupied for longer than 5 years, the 
same equivalent hypothesis (i.e. γ
1
L = γT) is also rejected at 5% throughout. This implies that, compared to 
parcels they own, households invest significantly less in parcels to which by law they have been granted 
permanent and heritable occupancy rights. The magnitude of such under-investment remains large; 
according to the point estimates, bona fide occupancy on customary land reduces the investment 
disincentives associated with lack of full ownership by about half for both soil conservation (γT=0.13; 
γ
1
L=0.07) and tree planting(γT =0.18; γ
1
L=0.10). On land with mailo or freehold tenure, legal protection is 
estimated to have no (additional) significant effect on reducing investment disincentives for soil 
conservation and a rather limited one for tree planting (γT+γD=0.33;  γ
1
L=0.10). In both cases, but 
especially where land owners have formal documents, lack of full ownership is as a key factor that may 
undermine long-term investment. 
4.2 Input use, yields, and productivity 
Household fixed effects estimates of parameters with the number of days of labor input per acre and the 
value of crop output per acre as dependent variables are presented in table 6. We find that, in line with 
expectations, once crop choice is accounted for, land tenure has little impact on intensity of input use or 
the level of output. While this supports the notion that no important variables have been omitted from the 
regressions, the results also point towards a large productivity advantage of tree crops. One notes that 
  13banana, fruit, and coffee either require significantly less total labor
19 input (coffee and banana) or produce 
much higher output values (fruits and banana) than other crops. While banana requires about 50% less 
total labor, the value of output is about 20% above the average, whereas coffee produces average levels of 
output with 27% less labor and fruits produce 42% higher levels of output with average levels of labor. 
Compared to vegetables and root crops which yield higher output (by 55% and 34%) but also require 44% 
and 25% more labor, respectively, productivity of tree crops is thus very favorable.  
To quantify the associated effects, we value labor very conservatively at a rate of US $ 1 per day 
and noting that the mean levels of labor input and value of crop output per acre amount to 65 days and US 
$ 101, we note that the expected net productivity gain from having full ownership as compared to only 
occupancy rights on customary land is expected to amount to 3.5% for coffee, 16.3% for fruits, and 
20.0% for banana with correspondingly larger gains of 9.3%, 31.9%, and 39.1%, respectively, on freehold 
or mailo land. To interpret these figures, note that they are very conservative estimates as they completely 
neglect the value of soil fertility investment which can be very large according to recent studies valuing 
annual nutrient loss due to lack of soil conservation at 20% of average household income (Pender et al. 
2004). Given that in addition we also exclude any credit-related investment incentives due to clear land 
ownership, the coefficients estimated here points towards substantial economic effects of overlapping 
property rights.  
4.3 Options to increase tenure security  
Our results thus far imply that, despite legal provisions aiming to strengthen property rights to land that is 
only occupied but not owned, significant and quantitatively large investment disincentives persist and 
cause productivity losses of considerable magnitude. This makes it important to explore other ways of 
bringing investment levels on such land closer to the social optimum. To explore this, our survey asked 
households who occupied land under usufruct about their willingness to pay to acquire full ownership 
rights. Results, as reported in table 7, suggest that 40% of 2,804 owners were willing to pay for about 
37% of the 4,478 occupied parcels overall or 43% of the 1,519 parcels under freehold or mailo. The 
median willingness to pay, US$ 215/acre for customary and US$ 269 per acre for mailo or freehold land 
is surprisingly large, both if compared to owners’ median self-assessed value of US$ 403/acre. It is also 
high in view of the fact that, at least in the case of mailo or freehold, the economic value of landlords’ 
residual claims to a perpetual ground rent of about US$ 0.6 annually is minuscule.  
Although part of the stated willingness to pay could have its origin in non-economic values of 
land ownership, the fact that a large number of households are willing to spend large amounts of 
                                                 
19 As was highlighted earlier in the descriptive statistics, the use of purchased inputs such as improved seeds, fertilizer and pesticides remains 
very limited and we focus therefore on labor as the main input.  
  14resources to acquire full land ownership supports our notion of significant economic gains from full 
ownership that can not be realized by just legalizing tenants. More importantly from a policy perspective, 
it would imply that a program for buying out such residual claims may indeed be feasible and that more 
thinking on its possible design may be of interest. While there is no justification for a land fund, it may be 
worth thinking of a credit program that would provide such funds on a credit basis. 
To explore factors underlying this phenomenon, and in particular whether the willingness to pay 
varies with tenure status, legal recognition and wealth, we run cross-sectional probit and tobit regressions 
(detailed results not reported) for probability and amount of resources willing to pay, respectively. While 
we do not find any significant effects of tenure status and legal recognition, some suggestive evidence is 
derived regarding the relationships between household wealth (excluding the value of owned land) and 
their willingness to pay in order to obtain full ownership rights on occupied parcels. The marginal 
elasticity of the reported amount that occupants’ are willing to pay with respect to wealth, though inelastic 
with 0.36, is positive and statistically different from zero. But wealth elasticity on the probability of 
willingness to pay is very negligible (0.03), implying that poorer tenants will possibly be over-bid even if 
they are equally willing to buy full ownership rights on occupied parcels.  
 
5. Conclusion and policy implications 
Although a large literature explores the effectiveness of titling interventions, and the impacts of tenure 
security on investment and productivity of land use, the African literature has not led to a consensus on 
whether insecurity should be of concern to policy makers or on how to most effectively address it. Our 
findings contribute to the methodological and the policy debate. Methodologically, the ability to use 
within household fixed effect estimates allows us to demonstrate that tenure insecurity has statistically 
very significant effects on investment and thus the productivity of land use. The fact that both our sample 
and the point estimates obtained are several times larger than what is reported in the few comparable 
studies suggests that, in the case of Uganda, higher tenure security could considerably affect agricultural 
performance. As none of the effects found here is likely to be attributable to credit supply effects, any 
ability to harness such effects could further increase benefits. Second, we note that, partly due to limited 
credibility that may originate in contradictory policy stances, legal provisions aiming to remove tenure 
insecurity, though not completely ineffectual, failed to achieve the desired impact. Not too surprisingly, 
we find that such measures were particularly ineffective in encouraging tenants to make long-term 
investments on land that continues to be registered in the name of the landlord, implying scope for 
particularly large productivity gains in such situations.  
  15Although the institutional structures explored here are specific to Uganda, our findings are of 
much broader applicability. They will be of particular policy relevance in two types of situations. One is 
the traditional case of redistributive land reform that awarded permanent and often heritable use rights to 
tenants without fully extinguishing owners’ residual claims (Binswanger et al. 1993). Similar 
configurations could arise where reform beneficiaries received use rights while ownership is vested with 
the state bureaucracy and can be revoked in case of ‘inappropriate’ behavior or diversion of land to non-
agricultural uses. The fact that we find large impacts on investment even in a situation where landlords’ 
rights have de jure been all but eliminated leads one to expect much more pronounced effects in 
circumstances where tenants continue to have to pay rent. A second type of circumstances that is 
particularly relevant for Africa arises where, under conditions of land abundance, in-migrants were given 
cultivation rights the nature of which is not precisely defined and where greater land scarcity implies that 
these arrangements are increasingly questioned and in danger of being ‘adjusted’ or even revoked. In both 
cases, exploring the size of investment disincentives, and of measures that could help to reduce or 
eliminate such impacts, would be of considerable interest. Methodologically, doing so could allow to 
better distinguish tenure security, transferability, and credit supply effects of land-related interventions 
and to provide evidence on their significance and magnitude in specific settings. From a policy 
perspective, it could help to illustrate the range of institutional issues involved and the number of 
interventions that will affect tenure security and transferability of land rights.  
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Basic household characteristics      
Household  size  6.0 6.1 5.1  6.4 
Number of children less than 15  3.1  3.0  2.6  3.4 
Number of adults   2.7  2.7  2.3  2.8 
Number of the elderly above 60  0.3  0.4  0.1  0.2 
Age of the head of the household  43.7  47.4  38.5  41.1 
Female headed households  (%)  25.9 26.1 33.3  21.0 
Household level knowledge of land law  changes  (%)  16.5 16.9 17.9  15.1 
Male adult knowledge of the changes in the land law (%)  14.5  14.9  15.1  13.3 
Female adult knowledge of the changes in the land law (%)  9.5  9.4  11.1  8.7 
Monthly expenditure per capita in US$  18.9  20.0  20.1  16.5 
Total income per capita in US$  214.0  226.6  215.3  193.4 
Share of agriculture (%)  42.1  42.1  30.9  50.0 
Share of wage income (%)  29.7  28.1  41.8  24.4 
Share of non-farm enterprise profit (%)  28.1  29.8  27.3  25.6 
Assets       
Value of livestock in US$  570.3  968.2  114.2  226.7 
Value of household assets in US$  1336.7  1650.4  733.0  1215.8 
Value of enterprise assets  in  US$  59.2 82.7 36.9  36.1 
Value of household and enterprise assets in US$  1395.9  1733.0  769.8  1251.8 
Value of land with full ownership in US$  3093.6  4011.1    1651.7 
Share of land value in total value of assets (%)  61.1  59.8    52.8 
Area of own land in acres  5.7  9.5  0.0  3.2 
Area of usufruct land in acres  1.3  0.0  3.1  2.3 
Total Area of land in acres  7.0  9.5  3.1  5.5 
Number of own land parcels  1.9  2.1    1.7 
Number of usufruct parcels  1.6    1.8  1.5 
Total Number of parcels  2.4  2.1  1.8  3.1 
Crop production       
Area covered under crops during the second season of 2004  2.6  2.8  1.6  2.8 
Value of crop output during the second season of 2004  347.5  366.9  164.0  419.3 
Area covered under crops during the first season of 2005  2.7  3.0  1.6  2.9 
Value of crop output during the first season of 2005  190.2  194.2  140.9  212.2 
Value of crop output per acre
a   101.5  96.7  95.3  110.8 
Number of observations (households)  5530  2726  1076  1728 
Source: Own computation from 2005/06 UNHS III 
Notes:
a Plot area weighted average of the value of crop output per acre of the two agriculture seasons. 
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  Full sample  Owner-cum-occupants 
  All Own  Usufruct  All Own  Usufruct 
Parcel characteristics        
Parcel area in acres  2.96 3.64 1.65 1.75 1.88 1.60 
Good  land  quality  44.3 45.1 42.6 44.4 42.1 46.9 
Medium land quality  45.1 44.6 46.1 45.0 46.0 43.7 
Poor land quality  10.6  10.3 11.3 10.6 11.8  9.3 
Rain-fed  96.4 97.4 94.5 95.7 97.5 93.6 
Swamp/wetland 2.7  1.8 4.5 3.6 1.8 5.6 
Hilly  10.2 10.6  9.3  11.2 11.1 11.3 
Flat land  48.2  46.3  52.0 48.5 48.1 49.0 
Gently sloped land  35.0 36.4 32.2 33.7 34.8 32.4 
Valley  3.1 2.7 4.1 3.6 2.7 4.7 
Distance from house in km  1.9 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.4 
Tenure status & perceived rights        
Concerned about land conflict  14.2 11.1 20.2 15.1 11.4 19.3 
Freehold, mailo and leasehold  25.3  20.8 33.9 22.4 19.4 25.9 
Customary  tenure  73.7 78.6 64.2 76.7 80.2 72.6 
Sell  without  approval  17.7 25.8  1.9  13.7 25.1  0.7 
Sell with family approval  30.5 44.7  2.8  26.0 47.5  1.5 
Sell with outside approval  15.7 20.9  5.6  13.3 21.1  4.4 
Plant trees without approval  26.0  37.2  4.1  19.4  35.0  1.7 
Plant trees with family approval  30.3 44.2  3.0  26.1 47.7  1.4 
Plant trees with outside approval  10.1  12.9 4.7  8.2 12.5 3.3 
No right to plant trees  33.6 5.6 88.3  46.2 4.8 93.5 
Use as collateral without approval  50.6 69.8 13.0 37.9 66.7  5.1 
Use as collateral with family approval  17.0 24.7  1.9  15.3 27.9  0.9 
No right to use as collateral  27.5 1.8 77.8  41.9 2.0 87.5 
Land-related improvements        
Parcel has coffee trees  17.1  22.8  6.1  14.9  24.9  3.5 
Parcel has fruit trees  39.0 46.5 24.4 33.4 47.0 17.8 
Parcel has trees to improve soil fertility  12.2 13.2 10.1 10.1 13.0  6.8 
Parcel has any type of trees  50.2 59.1 32.8 43.7 60.5 24.5 
Number of trees per acre  71.1 99.8 15.1 79.7  138.3  12.8 
Planted coffee trees during the past 5 years  8.7  11.7  2.8  7.3  12.8  1.1 
Planted fruit trees during the past  5  years 16.2 21.2  6.5  12.3 20.9  2.6 
Planted soil fertility trees past 5  years  3.8 4.8 2.0 2.8 4.8 0.5 
Planted (any) trees during the past  5  years  18.6 24.4  7.3  14.5 24.6  3.0 
Number of trees planted past 5  years  16.6 22.4  5.3  17.8 28.1  6.1 
Soil cons. (bunds, terracing, mulching)  20.5 24.7 12.3 19.9 27.6 11.0 
Use of manure during the past year  7.8 9.6 4.2 7.2  11.2  2.7 
Number of observations (parcels)   13130  8652  4478  5448  2904  2544 
Source: Own computation from 2005/06 UNHS III 
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Table 3: Cropping patterns and input intensity at the parcel level by ownership status 
  Full sample  Owner-cum-occupants 
  Total Own  Usufruct.  Total Own  Usufruct 
Cropping patterns         
Cropped plot area (acres)  1.3 1.4 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Parcel has cereals  36.0  34.7 39.0 34.0 29.6 39.7 
Parcel has pulses and oilseeds  29.3 29.1 29.8 26.0 23.4 29.4 
Parcel has vegetables  2.0 1.8 2.5 2.0 1.6 2.6 
Parcel has root crops  41.7 40.9 43.4 36.9 35.5 38.7 
Parcel has fruit trees  1.7 2.0 1.1 1.3 1.6 0.9 
Parcel has banana  26.5 33.5 10.4 23.5 38.1  4.9 
Parcel has coffee  9.2  12.0 2.8  8.2 13.7 1.2 
Parcel has other cash crops  5.2 5.8 3.7 4.9 5.7 4.0 
Non-labor inputs        
Purchased seed dummy  30.8 30.2 32.1 27.1 25.6 28.9 
Fertilizer  use  dummy  1.7 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.2 2.0 
Pesticides use dummy  5.5 5.1 6.4 6.0 5.3 6.9 
Manure use dummy  5.5  6.7 3.0 5.4 8.3 1.7 
Labor inputs        
Male family labor dummy  68.6 71.0 63.4 67.4 69.8 64.3 
Female family labor dummy  92.1 92.0 92.3 94.1 94.3 93.7 
Hired labor dummy  30.2  30.5 29.7 27.7 25.0 31.1 
Exchange labor dummy  17.6 16.9 19.3 16.4 13.6 20.1 
Number of male family labor days  per  acre  20.4 19.7 21.8 20.2 19.2 21.4 
Number of female family labor days  per  acre  44.5 40.1 54.7 48.9 42.4 57.2 
Total family labor days per acre  64.9 59.8 76.5 69.0 61.6 78.6 
Total exchange labor days per acre  2.7 2.4 3.3 2.5 1.6 3.6 
Total family and exchange labor days  per  acre  68.1 63.0 79.8 72.3 64.6 82.3 
Hired labor days per acre  3.2 3.2 3.4 3.3 3.0 3.7 
Total labor days per acre  70.8 65.4 83.2 74.8 66.2 85.8 
Number of observations (parcels)  18220  12658  5562  6628  3720  2908 
Source: Own computation from 2005/06 UNHS III 
Note: Unit of observation is a parcel (under crop) in a given season. Thus the same parcel could provide two observations if 
cultivated in both seasons in the reference period (July 2004 – June 2005).  
 
  19Table 4: Determinants of land-related investments: Fixed effects linear probability models 
  Any tree  Tree investment 
last 5 years 
Soil conservation  Manure 
application 
Ownership  dummy  0.308*** 0.168*** 0.130*** 0.057*** 
 (18.76)  (13.25)  (10.06)  (6.33) 
Mailo or freehold dummy  -0.071  -0.002  -0.040  0.025 
  (1.46) (0.05) (0.97) (0.90) 
Ownership*Mailo or freehold  0.072***  0.141***  0.026  0.012 
  (2.62) (5.66) (1.14) (0.70) 
Ownership*Household wealth*10
-4 0.004 0.015 -0.005  0.018* 
  (0.37) (1.49) (0.41) (1.92) 
Parcel area in acres  0.002***  0.001**  0.000  0.000 
  (3.69) (2.20) (0.89) (0.70) 
No. of years possessed  0.006***  0.002***  0.002***  0.002*** 
  (7.05) (3.43) (3.04) (3.31) 
Distance to house  -0.004***  -0.003***  -0.004***  -0.002*** 
  (3.73) (4.06) (5.18) (4.24) 
Good soil quality  -0.035*  -0.021  0.035**  0.027** 
  (1.94) (1.42) (2.40) (2.49) 
Poor soil quality  0.056**  0.026  -0.024  -0.012 
  (2.02) (1.17) (1.08) (0.71) 
Flat topography  0.050*  0.004  -0.010  0.050*** 
  (1.89) (0.17) (0.42) (3.11) 
Gently sloped  0.031  0.011  0.040*  0.065*** 
  (1.20) (0.56) (1.77) (3.81) 
Irrigated land  -0.045  -0.073 0.129 -0.062 
  (0.41) (0.59) (0.94) (0.56) 
Swamp/wetland -0.152***  -0.056**  0.099***  -0.017 
  (4.13) (2.05) (2.69) (0.72) 
Constant 0.214***  0.025  0.099***  -0.037** 
  (8.18) (1.24) (4.44) (2.31) 
Observations  5448 5448 5448 5448 
Number of households  1728  1728  1728  1728 
R
2 0.27 0.17 0.10 0.06 
Overall investment impact of ownership   33.1  55.7  30.2  40.5 
Investment impact on occupied plots   116.0  537.8  121.2  239.2 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 
  20Table 5: Determinants of land-related investments controlling for types of occupants: Fixed effects linear probability models 
  Any tree  Tree investment 
last 5 years 
Soil conservation  Manure 
application 
Ownership dummy, γT 0.331*** 0.177*** 0.135*** 0.055*** 
 (19.30)  (13.41)  (10.00)  (5.75) 
Mailo or freehold dummy  -0.078  -0.006  -0.043  0.024 
  (1.60) (0.18) (1.05) (0.87) 
Ownership*Mailo or freehold, γD 0.093*** 0.151***  0.033  0.012 
  (3.38) (6.06) (1.43) (0.72) 
Ownership*Household wealth*10
-4 0.007 0.017 -0.004  0.018* 
  (0.74) (1.60) (0.33) (1.91) 
Protected occupant: 5-12 years, γ
2
L 0.110*** 0.025  0.005  -0.024 
  (2.95) (0.86) (0.17) (1.17) 
Protected occupant: more than 12 years, γ
1
L 0.193*** 0.100***  0.069**  0.007 
  (4.37) (2.60) (2.10) (0.25) 
Parcel area in acres  0.001***  0.001*  0.000  0.000 
  (3.36) (1.85) (0.82) (0.76) 
No. of years possessed  0.005***  0.002***  0.002***  0.002*** 
  (6.19) (3.02) (2.78) (3.33) 
Distance to house  -0.004***  -0.002***  -0.003***  -0.002*** 
  (3.56) (3.90) (5.14) (4.26) 
Good soil quality  -0.033*  -0.020  0.035**  0.027** 
  (1.82) (1.35) (2.45) (2.48) 
Poor soil quality  0.060**  0.027  -0.023  -0.013 
  (2.14) (1.23) (1.06) (0.73) 
Flat topography  0.049*  0.003  -0.010  0.050*** 
  (1.86) (0.16) (0.43) (3.11) 
Gently sloped  0.030  0.011  0.039*  0.064*** 
  (1.16) (0.52) (1.74) (3.79) 
Irrigated land  -0.041  -0.073 0.128 -0.064 
  (0.38) (0.59) (0.93) (0.58) 
Swamp/wetland -0.150***  -0.055**  0.100***  -0.018 
  (4.03) (2.02) (2.70) (0.74) 
Constant 0.195***  0.018  0.095***  -0.035** 
  (7.39) (0.88) (4.29) (2.20) 
Observations  5448 5448 5448 5448 
Number of households  1728  1728  1728  1728 
R
2 0.28 0.18 0.10 0.06 
F-test: γT = γ
2
L 36.16*** 27.11*** 19.48*** 15.58*** 
F-test: γT = γ
1
L 9.66*** 3.98**  4.02**  3.02* 
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  Parcel level   Household level 
  Total labor  Family labor   Crop output per acre 
Ownership dummy  0.018  0.034  -0.066 
  (0.51) (0.99) (0.85) 
Mailo or freehold  -0.000  -0.008  0.277 
  (0.00) (0.09) (1.55) 
Ownership*Mailo or freehold  -0.065  -0.084  -0.128 
  (1.26) (1.63) (1.23) 
Distance to house  -0.009***  -0.010***  -0.016** 
  (2.97) (3.06) (1.98) 
No. of years possessed  0.000  0.000  0.008** 
  (0.23) (0.24) (2.26) 
Good soil quality  -0.005  -0.006  0.093 
  (0.13) (0.16) (1.09) 
Poor soil quality  -0.097*  -0.089*  -0.099 
  (1.85) (1.69) (0.79) 
Flat topography  -0.008  -0.006  0.081 
  (0.18) (0.12) (0.76) 
Gently Slope  -0.035  -0.032  0.003 
  (0.77) (0.71) (0.02) 
Irrigated land  -0.293  -0.334  1.073 
  (0.99) (1.13) (1.46) 
Swamp/wetland  0.262*** 0.262*** 0.506*** 
  (3.49) (3.48) (2.86) 
Vegetables  0.444*** 0.440*** 0.546*** 
  (4.80) (4.73) (2.64) 
Roots  0.247*** 0.264*** 0.339*** 
  (8.67) (9.23) (5.00) 
Fruits -0.055  -0.050  0.418** 
  (0.44) (0.40) (2.15) 
Banana -0.494***  -0.475***  0.194** 
 (12.15)  (11.62)  (2.20) 
Coffee -0.272***  -0.274***  -0.066 
  (4.22) (4.24) (0.63) 
Other cash crops  0.029  0.047  0.076 
  (0.45) (0.74) (0.55) 
Constant  3.867*** 3.813*** 3.768*** 
  (81.64) (80.12) (35.25) 
Observations  6628 6628 2150 
Number of households  1310  1310  1075 
R
2 0.08 0.07 0.06 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Notes: Unit of observation is a parcel (under crop) in a given season for the labor use regressions. A sub-sample of households who 
cultivate different types of crops on their owned and occupied parcels is used for the yield regression. The reference category for 
crop composition is cereals and pulses which are the dominant crops on occupied plots.  
  22Table 7: Land values and rental price by ownership status and region 
  Region  Tenure 
 Total  Central  Eastern  Northern  Western  Mailo/ 
Freehold 
Customary 
Parcels held under ownership            
Self-assessed land value (USD/acre; median) 403.2  430.1  430.1 161.3 536.6 537.6  358.4 
Self-assessed land rental (USD/acre; median)  21.5  26.9  21.5 16.1 26.9 26.9  21.5 
Number of parcels  8619  1440  2522  2026  2631  1784  6835 
Parcels held under usufruct            
Would like to buy full ownership  (%)  37.3  42.1  41.0 18.1 45.3 42.5  34.7 
If yes, willingness to pay (USD/acre; median)   215.1  215.1  215.1 107.5 322.6 268.8  215.1 
Paid rent (%parcels with owner’s consent)    62.1  44.7  68.1 54.6 72.4 52.0  65.4 
If yes, rent paid (USD/acre; median)    16.1  17.9  16.1 10.8 21.5 19.1  16.1 
Number of parcels  4478  1219  1320  967  972  1519  2959 
Source: Own computation from 2005/06 UNHS III 
 
  23Appendix table 1: Determinants of investments in specific tree crops: Fixed effects linear probability models 
  Any tree  Tree investment last 5 years 
  Fruit Coffee Fruit Coffee 
Ownership dummy  0.236***  0.138***  0.139***  0.072*** 
 (14.77)  (11.67)  (11.71)  (7.63) 
Mailo or freehold dummy  -0.035  -0.078**  -0.002  -0.036 
 (0.72)  (2.32)  (0.07)  (1.35) 
Ownership*Mailo or freehold  0.133***  0.151***  0.133***  0.118*** 
 (4.70)  (5.90)  (5.61)  (5.57) 
Ownership*Household wealth*10
-4 0.008 0.007 0.014  0.017* 
 (0.74)  (0.79)  (1.42)  (1.90) 
Parcel area in acre  0.001**  0.000  0.001**  0.000 
 (2.47)  (0.66)  (2.15)  (0.98) 
No. of years possessed  0.005***  0.005***  0.002***  0.002*** 
 (6.19)  (6.85)  (3.51)  (3.96) 
Distance to house  -0.003***  -0.003***  -0.002***  -0.001*** 
 (3.37)  (4.28)  (4.03)  (2.97) 
Good soil quality  -0.015  -0.009  -0.029**  0.000 
 (0.82)  (0.66)  (2.06)  (0.03) 
Poor soil quality  0.029  0.036  0.017  0.016 
 (1.04)  (1.63)  (0.84)  (0.95) 
Flat topography  0.082***  0.021  0.018  -0.004 
 (3.20)  (1.00)  (1.00)  (0.29) 
Gently sloped  0.063**  0.037*  0.016  0.008 
 (2.53)  (1.80)  (0.85)  (0.52) 
Irrigated land  -0.089  -0.086 -0.120 -0.098 
 (1.05)  (1.06)  (1.60)  (1.57) 
Swamp/wetland -0.099***  -0.068***  -0.047*  -0.024 
 (2.65)  (2.64)  (1.80)  (1.17) 
Constant  0.105***  0.022 0.015 0.010 
 (4.13)  (1.11)  (0.83)  (0.68) 
Observations  5448 5448 5448 5448 
Number of households  1728  1728  1728  1728 
R
2 0.22 0.19 0.16 0.11 
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